(registered 2026-11-18, last updated 2026-11-18) Media type name: application Media subtype name: vnd.emirian.blueprint Required parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A Encoding considerations: binary The representation is a proprietary binary container with an authenticated cleartext header and an encrypted body. The encrypted body contains the workflow blueprint and its internal approval seal, including the approval statement and signature. The seal is not a separate file or an unencrypted trailing block. Blueprint JSON is canonicalized using the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) and compressed using DEFLATE with zlib framing (RFC 1950) before encryption. The top-level representation is not JSON, XML, or ZIP. Security considerations: The format contains declarative agentic workflow definitions, not embedded native executable code or script programs. However, interpreting and deploying a blueprint can direct agents, capabilities, document access, and external operations. Importing or previewing a file must not authorize or execute its workflow. Deployment and execution require separate approval, authorization, and enforcement of tenant capability restrictions. The blueprint and approval provenance can contain confidential information requiring confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity protection. EMRI-1 requires AES-256-GCM encryption of the body, with the cleartext header included as additional authenticated data. Each payload-encryption operation uses a freshly generated 256-bit file key and a 96-bit nonce. File keys must not be reused for a subsequent payload-encryption operation. The file key is wrapped using AES-256-KW under the owning tenant's key-encryption key, following RFC 3394. AES-KW does not require a wrapping nonce. The wrapped key and its routing metadata are included in the authenticated header. Tenant secret keys are maintained server-side within the tenant's authorized boundary. Unwrapped file keys, tenant key-encryption keys, and signing private keys must not be included in the file or embedded in distributed client software. Implementations must protect key generation, storage, use, backup, and retirement. Key lookup must be restricted to an independently established, authorized tenant context. Identifiers supplied by a file must not authorize access to another tenant's keys. The trusted tenant context, authenticated header, and signed approval statement must agree. Approval is established separately from successful decryption. An internal seal binds a SHA-256 digest of the canonical blueprint to its approval context, tenant, blueprint identity, artifact version, schema identity, approving authority, approval timestamp, and signing-key identity. The approval statement is signed using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 and deterministic signing under RFC 6979. The approval statement, content digest, and signature are inside the encrypted body. Neither a plaintext content digest nor a declared uncompressed length is exposed in the cleartext header. Header contents and total container size remain visible. The verification algorithm is determined by the authorized key record in the tenant trust store. In-file algorithm identifiers are cross-checked against that record and must not select an arbitrary verification algorithm. Unknown or unauthorized keys, mismatched identifiers, and invalid signatures must not confer approval or authorize deployment. Readers must validate container boundaries and lengths and reject malformed or unsupported representations. Header fields remain untrusted until authentication succeeds. Plaintext must not be released for decompression, parsing, rendering, or workflow processing before successful AES-GCM authentication. Readers must enforce local limits on input size, decompressed output, memory consumption, processing time, JSON nesting depth, and workflow complexity. Output limits must be enforced during decompression, including for authenticated files. File-supplied lengths must not override local resource limits. Compression can disclose information through ciphertext length. Authoring and export interfaces must not expose an oracle that allows unauthorized parties to combine attacker-controlled input with undisclosed blueprint content and repeatedly observe resulting file sizes. Compressing each blueprint separately does not remove all content-dependent size leakage. The JSON security considerations in RFC 8259, Section 12, and the JCS security considerations in RFC 8785, Section 5, apply to JSON structures in the format. Readers must parse JSON as data, never evaluate it as code, reject duplicate object member names, and enforce the applicable schema, canonicalization rules, numeric constraints, and workflow semantic checks before use. Blueprints can reference agents, capabilities, documents, and other resources outside the file. Resolution of these references requires tenant authorization. Their presence in an authenticated or signed file does not independently grant access or authorize automatic external retrieval. A valid seal does not establish that approval remains current or that the artifact is the latest authorized version. Deployment must apply current tenant policies for approval status, key trust, revocation, artifact versions, and replay or rollback prevention. Encryption maintenance must preserve the original content approval only when the signed content and approval statement are unchanged. Changing authenticated container metadata requires a newly authenticated container. Re-encryption must use a fresh file key and nonce; it must not reuse the original key and nonce with changed authenticated data. Maintenance must not be represented as a new human approval. The format does not prevent an authorized recipient from disclosing decrypted content and does not protect plaintext in a compromised authorized processing environment. References: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259.html#section-12 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785.html#section-5 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725.html#section-2.4 Interoperability considerations: Compatibility depends on support for the container version, blueprint schema, and cryptographic profile used by the file. Readers must reject unsupported container versions, incompatible schemas, and unsupported cryptographic profiles rather than guessing or silently substituting alternatives. Published specification: N/A Status: in preparation; not yet published. Proprietary format controlled by Archiplexus Architects LLC. Contact for specification and implementation inquiries: formats&emirian.ai Applications which use this media: Emirian Agentic Governance Platform, developed by Archiplexus Architects LLC. Emirian Mandate provides visual authoring of governed multi-agent workflow blueprints. Emirian Global Command provides blueprint governance, approval, and controlled deployment. The media type is intended for blueprint interchange and archival storage within the owning tenant's authorized environment. Fragment identifier considerations: Fragment identifiers are not defined for this media type. Restrictions on usage: This proprietary format is intended for creation and interpretation by licensed installations of the Emirian Agentic Governance Platform. Additional information: 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A 2. Magic number(s): 45 4D 52 49 1A 0A (hexadecimal; 6 octets at byte offset 0). 3. File extension(s): .emri, .emir 4. Macintosh file type code: N/A 5. Object Identifiers: N/A General Comments: A proprietary, sealed, tenant-bound governed workflow definition authored in the Emirian Agentic Governance Platform, with associated provenance and approval metadata. The protected workflow content is cryptographically bound to the owning licensed tenant and carries an approval signature issued by that tenant's governance authority. Access to the protected content requires tenant-authorized decryption. Deployment additionally requires valid tenant approval and applicable permissions. General-purpose tools can store or transfer the container but cannot directly interpret its encrypted workflow content. Person to contact for further information: 1. Name: Archiplexus Architects LLC 2. Email: formats&emirian.ai Intended usage: LIMITED USE Intended for governed workflow blueprint interchange and archival storage within licensed Emirian Agentic Governance Platform environments. General-purpose interpretation or deployment outside the platform is not supported. Author/Change controller: Archiplexus Architects LLC formats&emirian.ai